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Economists have greatly improved 
their understanding of the dynamics 
he concept of resource slack is central 
to understanding the dynamics between 
employment, output, and inflation. But what 
amount of slack is consistent with price 
stability? To answer this question, economists define 
baseline values for unemployment and output known as 
the natural rate of unemployment and potential output.  
The concepts of output and employment gaps can be 
useful to economists in several ways. First, they often 
guide the inflation forecasts of Federal Reserve staff 
and other researchers and market participants. Second, 
some economists argue that employment gaps are a 
useful guide for policy aimed at achieving maximum 
sustainable employment and price stability. In this 
article, Roc Armenter briefly discusses two important 
examples of sophisticated measures of resource slack that 
are grounded in economic theory: the nonaccelerating- 
inflation rate of unemployment and the output gap 
measure published quarterly by the Congressional Budget 
Office.
between employment, output, and 
inflation since the 1970s. The concept 
of resource slack is central to these 
dynamics. For example, economists 
track the share of unemployed 
workers, allowing them to estimate 
how quickly firms may be able to 
expand employment without having to 
raise wages to attract workers. Other 
measures of slack are the percentage 
of industrial capacity available or the 
ratio of inventories to sales.
It is unreasonable to expect all 
workers to be employed or industrial 
capacity to be at 100 percent. For 
example, unemployed workers will take 
the time to find the best job for them 
and perhaps may need time to relocate.
What amount of slack is 
consistent with price stability? To 
answer this question, economists 
define baseline values for 
unemployment and output known, 
respectively, as the natural rate of 
unemployment and potential output. 
These are the levels of employment 
and output consistent with the 
economy operating with stable prices. 
The output gap and employment gap 
are defined as the differences between 
the actual level for each variable and 
the baseline value. The actual level 
may be lower than the baseline level, 
and thus the output or employment 
gap can be negative.
The output and employment gap 
concepts can be useful to economists 
in several ways. First, output and 
employment gaps often guide the 
inflation forecasts of Federal Reserve 
staff, as well as those of researchers 
and market participants. For example, 
if the output gap is positive — that 
is, output is above its baseline level 
— firms will be operating close to 
full production capacity. Hence, 
firms will not be able to increase 
production further without significant 
investments. These investments are 
costly so it will take a while for firms to 
increase production. In the meantime, 2   Q1  2011 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
firms will respond to increased 
demand by raising prices. Thus, 
positive output gaps can signal future 
inflationary pressures. Since monetary 
policy operates with significant lags, it 
is important that policymakers have an 
accurate inflation forecast.
Second, some economists argue 
that employment gaps are a useful 
guide for policy aimed at achieving 
maximum sustainable employment 
and price stability, which are the 
mandated objectives of monetary 
policy in the United States. Over the 
medium term, employment is driven 
by fundamentals such as productivity 
and labor supply growth, and these 
medium-term measures are used to 
infer simultaneously the natural rate of 
unemployment and the unemployment 
gap. Most economists do not think 
monetary policy is part of these 
medium-term fundamentals. Instead, 
attempts to drive employment or 
output above their fundamental levels 
would result in unwanted inflation and 
no employment gains.
Economists have developed 
sophisticated measures of resource 
slack that are grounded in economic 
theory, yet remain workable in 
practical terms. We will briefly 
discuss two important examples: 
the nonaccelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment (NAIRU) model and 
the output gap measure published 
quarterly by the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO). However, 
even the latest models recognize 
that there is a large amount of 
uncertainty about output and 
employment gaps. Moreover, there 
remain competing definitions of 
the output and employment gaps. 
Alternative measures sometimes offer 
contrasting implications for monetary 
policy. Therefore, it is important to 
understand the limitations of current 
output gap estimates for both inflation 
forecasting and output stabilization.
MILTON FRIEDMAN AND 
THE NATURAL RATE OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT
Economists have long believed in 
a relationship between money, prices, 
and employment — some say since the 
18th century! 1 However, it was not 
until 1958 that A.W. Phillips provided 
the first statistical analysis comparing 
wage inflation and unemployment, us-
ing data for the United Kingdom since 
1861.2 Phillips found that when unem-
ployment was high, inflation was low. 
This negative relationship now bears 
his name: the Phillips curve. A few 
years later Paul Samuelson and Robert 
Solow imported the Phillips curve to 
the United States.3 Samuelson and 
Solow used price inflation instead of 
wage inflation, a choice now preferred 
by most researchers. Figure 1 displays 
a typical Phillips curve plot for the pe-
riod 1948-1965. Each dot corresponds 
to the inflation and unemployment 
rate during a quarter. The solid line 
displays the statistical relationship.
Nowadays economists recognize 
that the Phillips curve is more than 
a statistical relationship between two 
variables. The modern view of the 
Phillips curve is rooted in the ideas 
that Milton Friedman developed at 
the University of Chicago during the 
late 1960s.4 Friedman believed that 
attempts to increase employment 
by increasing inflation were mis-
guided. Only unanticipated inflation, 
Friedman argued, has the ability to 
stimulate employment. For example, 
if households and firms expect an 
inflation rate of 2 percent, a 3 percent 
inflation rate would effectively increase 
output and employment by boosting 
real demand. However, as workers and 
firms came to expect a 3 percent infla-
tion rate, they would embody such ex-
pectations in wage demands and price 
setting. As a result, an inflation of 3 
percent would increase nominal output 
compared with 2 percent inflation, but 
since all prices and wages adjusted by 
3 percent as well, there would be no 
change in real output and employment.
Friedman’s view was validated 
when inflation rose persistently in the 
1970s despite a marked slowdown in 
employment growth. Indeed, analysts 
coined the term stagflation to describe 
the combination of stagnant growth 
and inflation.
The old view of the Phillips curve 
could not explain the stagflation 
phenomenon. Figure 2 plots unemploy-
ment and inflation rates for the period 
1970-1979. We include the Phillips 
curve as given in Figure 1 for the 
period 1948-1965. The actual observa-
tions are all northeast of the Phillips 
curve: Both inflation and unemploy-
ment rates were higher than the theory 
predicted. This was not immediately 
recognized, and many policymakers 
mistakenly believed that inflation 
would reverse course and moderate.5 
1 Robert Lucas, in his Nobel lecture, traced the 
observation back to the writings of David Hume.
2 See the article by A.W. Phillips.
3 See the study by Samuelson and Solow.
4 For a detailed discussion of the so-called New 
Keynesian Phillips curve, see the article by 
Keith Sill on page 17.
Nowadays economists recognize that the 
Phillips curve is more than a statistical 
relationship between two variables.
5 The book by Thomas Sargent discusses the 
experience of the 1970s in rich detail.Business Review  Q1  2011   3 www.philadelphiafed.org
(See Did Oil Prices Cause the Inflation 
in the 1970s?)
Friedman defined a baseline value 
for employment in his theory and thus 
postulated employment gaps as we 
know them today. The so-called natu-
ral rate of unemployment is the rate we 
would observe if inflation were exactly 
as expected. This definition is mainly 
theoretical, but, as we shall see later, 
some current measures of employment 
gaps are inspired by this definition.
Friedman’s view came with some 
key policy “lessons” that would be 
learned the hard way. First, attempts 
to exploit the Phillips curve would 
bring about lower unemployment 
temporarily at best; further increases 
in the money supply would be met by 
rising inflation. Second, in order to 
be able to stabilize output in the short 
term without causing rising inflation, 
policymakers need to know what 
the natural rate of unemployment is. 
Friedman himself was deeply skeptical 
that this could be done effectively. 
To do so, policymakers would need 
to accurately forecast the state of 
the economy. Finally, Friedman’s 
analysis highlighted the importance 
of inflation expectations in achieving 
price stabilization. Nowadays central 
banks around the world realize that 
any attempt to exploit the trade-off 
between inflation and employment 
will be short-lived, at best. Thus, 
central bank policy emphasizes 
price stabilization in order to anchor 
inflation expectations.6
SOME OUTPUT AND 
EMPLOYMENT GAP MEASURES
Currently, there is an array of 
statistical procedures to approximate 
the natural rate of unemployment or its 
The Classical Phillips Curve 1948-1965
Quarterly data, 1948-1965, seasonally adjusted
Sources: BLS/Haver for unemployment rate; BEA/Haver for PCE inflation rate
FIGURE 1
                    
Quarterly data, 1970-1979, seasonally adjusted
Sources: BLS/Haver for unemployment rate; BEA/Haver for PCE inflation rate
FIGURE 2
6 The study by Jeffrey Lacker and John Weinberg 
contains further discussion of the Phillips curve 
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wice in the 1970s the price of oil soared. 
The first oil crisis started in October 
1973 when the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
declared it would stop oil shipments to 
the United States. Oil prices tripled in a 
year. The second oil crisis occurred in 1979 as a result of 
the Iranian revolution. Although some OPEC countries 
increased their production, oil prices more than doubled. 
The United States would have to wait until 1986 to see 
oil prices drop below $20 again.
Some of the most dramatic inflation rates recorded 
were associated with these oil crises. However, oil prices 
alone cannot explain the extraordinary behavior of prices 
and employment in the 1970s. First, the increase in the 
inflation rate was noticeable well before 1973, while oil 
prices remained low. The figure plots the inflation rate 
(left axis) and the oil-price level (right axis). By 1970, 
inflation was above 4 percent and never dropped below 3 
percent. Meanwhile, oil prices were completely flat.
Second, the crises of 1973 and 1979 were one-time 
price increases. As such, they can explain only temporary 
increases in inflation, for example, the spike in the 
inflation rate in 1974. However, one-time price increases 
cannot explain the persistent rise in inflation that is 
evident in the figure.* Inflation was close to 8 percent in 
1978, five years after the oil crisis.
Finally, inflation was widespread. Oil prices clearly 
affected the price of gas, transportation, and some other 
goods that use oil in their production. But oil prices 
should have only a small impact on other goods, such as 
food or apparel. Yet these goods also showed persistent 
inflationary behavior.
For further reading on oil prices and economic 
activity, see the Business Review article by Sylvain Leduc 
and the one by Keith Sill.
                                               
T
FIGURE
                                    
Quarterly data, 1964-1981
Sources: BEA/Haver for PCE inflation rate; Wall Street Journal/Haver for oil prices
* Cost increases, such as the oil shock, take some time to pass through to consumer prices. However, the rise in inflation was too large and, more 
important, too prolonged for any reasonable estimate of pass-through.
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equivalent concept in terms of GDP: 
potential output. There are many 
differences across these measures. For 
example, some models are evaluated 
monthly, others quarterly. Models also 
often differ in the variables taken into 
consideration. However, all of the gap 
measures discussed here share two 
defining properties. First, baseline 
levels are defined by their neutral 
stance on inflation; that is, they all 
try to measure the level of output or 
employment consistent with price 
stability. Second, researchers assume 
that the natural rate and potential 
output move slowly; that is, their 
determinants (such as labor supply) 
operate exclusively in the medium to 
long term.
We will now briefly discuss two 
leading models for employment and 
output gaps, respectively.
The NAIRU. The very name of 
the NAIRU — the nonaccelerating-
inflation rate of unemployment — 
spells out the model. The NAIRU is 
the level of unemployment consistent 
with inflation behaving as expected. 
In the model, researchers also specify 
how inflation and unemployment are 
related in the short term.
The NAIRU closely tracks Fried-
man’s ideas. In this model, expected 
inflation is usually given by an average 
of past inflation rates. The idea is 
that firms and households create their 
inflation expectations on the basis of 
their recent experience with prices. If 
inflation is unexpectedly high in one 
period, it will drive unemployment 
down, but it will also drive inflation 
expectations up, as the average of past 
inflation rates increases accordingly. 
If inflation stays at the same high 
rate, the effect on unemployment will 
be less. Hence the trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment is neces-
sarily short-lived. 
NAIRU models regularly incor-
porate information about real factors, 
such as commodity prices, that may af-
fect unemployment or inflation in the 
short run. Newer NAIRU models allow 
the natural rate of unemployment to 
vary over time.7  The fluctuations in 
the natural rate of unemployment, 
though, are assumed to be slow moving 
and very persistent. The assumption 
mostly conforms to our intuition. For 
example, the natural rate of unem-
ployment reflects long-term changes 
in labor productivity growth, brought 
about by the introduction of new 
technologies.
Figure 3 plots the unemployment 
rate and an estimate of the NAIRU 
for the period 1949-2005. The NAIRU 
increased in the 1970s and fell for most 
of the 1990s. However, the NAIRU 
is much smoother than the actual 
unemployment rate, capturing only 
the persistent swings in the data. The 
flip side, as shown in Figure 3, is that 
the employment gap — the difference 
between the NAIRU and the unem-
ployment rate — is relatively short-
lived; that is, it does not stay positive 
or negative for long periods of time.
CBO Output Gap.  The Con-
gressional Budget Office (CBO) pub-
lishes a quarterly estimate of potential 
output that is a key input to the fiscal 
policy outlook and is widely tracked 
by professional forecasters. The CBO 
defines potential output as the level 
of output that is neither adding to nor 
subtracting from inflationary pressures. 
Thus, it is an equivalent concept to 
the NAIRU in terms of output rather 
than employment.
Because of its focus on fiscal poli-
cy, the CBO is interested in forecasting 
output in the medium term in addi-
tion to inflation. The longer horizon 
forecast is needed in order to evaluate 
NAIRU and the Unemployment Rate
Quarterly data, 1949-2005
Sources: BLS/Haver for unemployment rate; Haver for NAIRU
FIGURE 3
7 For an overview of NAIRU models, see the 
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the fiscal cost of different programs 
and the debt and tax changes needed 
to finance them. To this end, the CBO 
makes an effort to incorporate addi-
tional information into its computation 
of potential output. For example, the 
CBO pays special attention to demo-
graphic and educational trends. These 
trends are important for forecasting 
the labor supply over the next five to 
10 years, but they are unlikely to affect 
inflation.
The CBO uses a production 
function approach to track gross 
domestic product.8 The production 
function is very good for combining 
diverse data sources. For example, 
the CBO uses data on labor supply, 
capital utilization rates, industrial 
capacity, and electricity consumption. 
Researchers then break down these 
data series into transitory and 
persistent components; then the latter 
is used to construct the estimate 
of potential output. A key input in 
the estimate is productivity or, more 
broadly speaking, technology. For 
this the CBO must rely on estimates 
of worker productivity and judgment 
calls. And, once again, the assumption 
is that these fundamentals are slow 
moving.9
Figure 4 plots the output gap 
series, as computed by the CBO, for 
the period 1956-2009. Whenever the 
output gap is positive, the economy 
is running above potential — for 
example, in the second half of the 
1990s. In contrast, the economy was 
below potential for most of the 1970s 
and early 1980s, as well as in 2009. 
With some exceptions, output gaps 
close quite fast, meaning the economy 
reverts to the path of potential output.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Economists continue to work on 
models of potential output and the 
natural rate of unemployment. Newer 
models seek a more flexible specifica-
tion of potential output, allowing for 
short-term fluctuations, or incorporate 
additional variables in the specifica-
tion, such as interest rates or aggregate 
consumption.
The second half of the 1990s also 
presented a challenge. As in the 1970s, 
the observed inflation and unem-
ployment rates did not square with 
existing models. This time, though, 
the situation was the opposite and thus 
more benign: Output and employ-
ment growth were high, yet inflation 
remained low and stable. Figure 5 plots 
the output gap, as computed by the 
CBO, and inflation, computed from 
personal consumption expenditures 
(PCE), for the second half of the 
1990s. The output gap turned positive 
in early 1996 and became very large by 
the end of the decade, as one can see 
from Figure 5 as well. Not only was the 
output gap large, but, by 2000, it had 
not shown any signs of moderation. In 
this context, many economic models 
would predict that inflation would rise 
sharply. Yet inflation actually declined 
from 1996 to 1998, as can also be seen 
in Figure 5. Only in 1998 and 1999 did 
inflation show a very modest pick-up.10 
SHORTCOMINGS OF
STATISTICAL GAPS
Despite the sophistication of these 
models, it turns out that they are lim-
ited in their ability to forecast inflation 
in the short term. It is important to 
understand the limitations of the use-
8 A production function states a relationship be-
tween inputs (like labor and capital) and output 
(goods and services combined).
9 For further reading on the computation of the 
CBO output gap, see the background paper 





10 The 2002 study by Staiger, Stock, and Watson 
contains an extensive discussion of the experi-
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11 Advanced models are careful to use real-time 
data. The Real-Time Data Research Center at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has 
developed a real-time data set for macroecono-
mists, available at http://www.philadelphiafed.
org/research-and-data/real-time-center/real-
time-data/.
fulness of output and employment gaps 
as a guide for setting monetary policy.
The first set of shortcomings of 
statistical models involves the data. 
Most macroeconomic data are released 
with a significant lag and are subject to 
revision. Moreover, forecasts must rely 
on the most recent releases, which are 
indeed the most likely to be revised. 
This is often known as the “end-of-
sample” problem, and there is little 
researchers can do about it. For ex-
ample, models that use GDP data must 
always rely on the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis’ (BEA) “advance” estimate 
for the last quarter, which is usually 
heavily revised.11
Another shortcoming arises from 
the assumption that estimates of po-
tential output and the natural rate of 
unemployment move smoothly. While 
we usually view the technology diffu-
sion process as slow and smooth, some 
factors can have a sudden impact on 
supply. For example, extreme weather 
conditions can lead to the disruption 
of services and, in some cases, have a 
very persistent effect. More important, 
this assumption implies that fluctua-
tions in output or unemployment are 
always initially counted as changes in 
the gap, not as changes in potential 
output or the natural rate of unem-
ployment. In more technical terms, 
errors in the short-term forecast of 
output or employment gaps accumu-
late, and it takes a while before these 
errors are corrected. For example, say 
a new technology brings a significant 
improvement in productivity and thus 
simultaneously increases potential and 
actual output. Because researchers 
do not observe productivity directly, 
the increase in output will be initially 
viewed as a temporary deviation and 
ascribed to an increase in the output 
gap. Only when researchers observe 
that the higher output level persists 
over the medium term will the esti-
mate of potential output be updated.
We return to the experience of 
the second half of the 1990s for a 
real-life example regarding estimates 
of potential output. Figure 6 plots (in 
black) the level of real GDP from 1996 
to 2006, with the level normalized to 
100 in 1996. As mentioned earlier, this 
was a period of rapid and persistent 
economic growth: Real GDP grew 20 
percent in four years. Let us see how 
estimates of potential output caught up 
with the experience. The gray line in 
Figure 6 plots the estimates of poten-
tial output provided by the CBO in 
1996; they are thus a forecast for the 
period. The dark blue line reports the 
estimates of potential output at the 
end of 1998. After three years of actual 
data pointing to strong GDP growth, 
economists barely nudged up their 
estimates of potential output.12 In other 
words, the model suggested a huge 
output gap. Finally, the light blue line 
plots the latest estimates of potential 
output. Economists now recognize that 
most of the growth in the second half 
of the 1990s was due to fundamentals: 
Estimates of potential output track 
real GDP much more closely than the 
initial estimates.
There are also reasons to think 
that the statistical relationship be-
tween inflation and output varies over 
time. Policymakers are aware of this 
and often have additional informa-
tion about the likely path of infla-
                                
Quarterly data, 1994-2000
Sources: CBO/Haver for output gap; BEA/Haver for PCE inflation
FIGURE 5
12 This is a problem common to all statistical 
models: It is difficult to distinguish temporary 
from permanent fluctuations at the end of the 
sample.
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Q3 1996tion or output that cannot be readily 
quantified. Statistical models provide 
little guidance on how to modify the 
resulting estimates in order to incor-
porate the additional information. For 
example, the current downturn has 
affected the manufacturing and con-
struction sectors disproportionately. It 
is clear that some workers will have to 
find jobs in new sectors, and this will 
take some additional time. The natural 
rate of unemployment will have to be 
adjusted upward at least for a time to 
account for the reallocation. However, 
the statistical models do not contain 
a breakdown by sector, and thus it is 
not clear how to modify the model’s 
estimates.
CONCLUSION
We have seen how economists 
have developed the concepts of output 
and employment gaps as key tools for 
understanding the long-term move-
ments in unemployment and output. 
These long-term measures are of-
ten used to provide information on 
economic activity relative to trend 
and thus help us gauge how relatively 
strong or weak current economic activ-
ity is. Understandably, such knowledge 
is often important for implementing 
economic policies.13 However, as this 
article has shown, measures of the 
NAIRU and potential output are sub-
ject to severe measurement problems 
that detract from their application. 
Therefore, it is important that we 
understand their limitations. B R
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GDP and Potential Output Estimates
Quarterly data, all series set equal to 100 in 1996
Sources: CBO for potential output estimates; BEA/Haver for real GDP
FIGURE 6
13 The article by Anthony Santomero discusses 
how the availability and reliability of economic 
information affects policymaking.
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